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Introduction
The European Court of  Human Rights (the ECtHR, Court/Strasbourg Court) ispresently facing a number of  challenges. The perennial problem of  its increasing
workload has led the Court to implement a number of  reforms. Ensuring compliance with
its decisions is another strategic goal for the Court, especially with regard to highly non-
compliant states. In addition, a number of  commentators and governments have recently
engaged in a debate concerning the limits of  the ECtHR’s jurisdiction: is the Court going
too far and – therefore – producing judgments that lack legitimacy?
In this challenging era for the Court, Protocol 15 amending the European Convention
for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention or
ECHR) was adopted in June 2013. One of  the main features or novelties of  this important
Protocol is the inclusion of  a specific reference to the subsidiarity principle and the margin of
appreciation the contracting parties enjoy when applying the Convention. Indeed, Article 1 of
the Protocol provides:
At the end of  the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be added,
which shall read as follows:
‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms
defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they
enjoy a margin of  appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of  the
European Court of  Human Rights established by this Convention’.
The two terms should be briefly explained. First, the margin of  appreciation is an
‘interpretational tool’ developed by the Strasbourg Court ‘to draw the line between what is
properly a matter for each community to decide at local level and what is so fundamental
that it entails the same requirement for all countries whatever the variations in traditions and
culture’.1 Put differently, the doctrine implies that ‘the state is allowed a certain measure of
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discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or
judicial action in the area of  a Convention right’.2 Second, in international law, the principle
of  subsidiarity ‘regulates how to allocate or use authority within a political or legal order,
typically in those orders that disperse authority between a centre and various member units’,
and suggests that ‘the burden of  argument lies with attempts to centralize authority’.3 The
most well-known application of  the principle in the Strasbourg machinery is the exhaustion
of  domestic remedies rule.4
Protocol 15 will enter into force once ratified by all member states (Article 7); the
experience with Protocol 14 has shown that this might not be a smooth and straightforward
process.5 The Protocol contains further provisions in addition to Article 1, most notably,
Article 2, which extends the age limit of  sitting judges to 74,6 and Article 4, which reduces
the limitation period to submit an application to the Court from six to four months. The
focus of  this paper is, however, on Article 1 of  the Protocol, due to its controversial or
ambiguous nature: critics of  the Strasbourg Court expect that the insertion of  the Protocol
into the Convention’s corpus will bring about a restraint in the so-called ‘activist’
interpretative activity of  the Court.7
This article is the first contribution aimed at explaining the rationale behind the
adoption of  Protocol 15, as well as assessing the impact of  the Protocol on the Court’s
jurisdiction. Once ratified, the Protocol will be at the core of  legal debate as regards the
margin of  appreciation conferred upon states and the operation of  the subsidiarity principle
within the Convention machinery. To that end, this paper advances two claims in relation
to Protocol 15. The first point concerns the background to its adoption. It is argued that
the Preamble is the product of  a compromise between two competing tendencies: on the one
hand, the Strasbourg institutions, led by the Court, stressed the reform agenda and placed
the Protocol in the context of  the reduction in the ECtHR’s workload; on the other, certain
governments, led by the UK, saw in the new Protocol an opportunity for judicial restraint
or an answer to their anxieties concerning an increasingly activist Court, in accordance with
the ongoing debate on the Court’s legitimacy. It will be argued that this is all the more
important since the divergent driving forces behind the adoption of  the Protocol will play
their own distinctive role once the issue of  the interpretation of  the new Preamble arises
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before the ECtHR. In this respect, the importance the Court has attached to the Preamble
of  the Convention should also be underlined.8
Second, and assessing the text of  the new preambulary paragraph, it is emphasised
that the formulation of  the text, subordinating the margin of  appreciation doctrine to the
Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, does not support any expressed ambition, on the part of
some contracting parties, to actually encourage the ECtHR’s so-called judicial restraint.
This is pivotal because it marks a departure from the status quo, whereby the ECtHR
confines the margin of  appreciation doctrine to its overall supervision through its
jurisprudence; once Protocol 15 is in force, the new Preamble will imply that this
confinement stems directly from the Convention. Thus, it will be argued that the new
preambulary paragraph eventually fails to impose limitations on the ECtHR’s existing
interpretative practices. In fact – but strictly legally – this very text could potentially
provide grounds for the Court to employ the paragraph as a vehicle to strengthen its
constitutional position. Nonetheless, it is submitted that this is politically quite improbable,
given that the discussion on the Court’s legitimacy occupies a prominent place in
academic discourse and beyond. The Court is aware of  this discussion and therefore the
probability of  such a move is – for the foreseeable future – remote.
This contribution is structured as follows. Its first part offers an analysis of  the
background to the adoption of  Protocol 15. Competing interests are identified, including
the position of  the Strasbourg institutions and the UK government. The second part
assesses the main features introduced by Protocol 15 to the Preamble. Three additions can
be identified: the reference to the margin of  appreciation; the reference to the subsidiarity
principle; and the subordination of  the margin of  appreciation doctrine to the supervisory
jurisdiction of  the Court. The article concludes by suggesting that the new Preamble, while
being the product of  a compromise between the two aforementioned competing
tendencies, eventually fails to restrain the ECtHR’s existing interpretative approach as to the
Convention.
1 Background and rationale: divergent ambitions
tHE PosItIoN of tHE stRasBoURg INstItUtIoNs
As a preliminary remark, it is noted that the reform of  the Court was the subject of  three
successive high-level conferences at Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton; these conferences took
place between 2010 and 2012.9 Moreover, following the Brighton Declaration,10 the
Committee of  experts on the reform of  the ECtHR published an open call for
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contributions on the long-term future of  the Convention and the Strasbourg Court.11 The
preparation of  the draft text of  Protocol 15 was assigned by the Committee of  Ministers
to the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH). The latter had, of  course, to take
into account the views expressed by the Strasbourg machinery and, most notably, the Court,
the states’ positions and the submissions by other relevant actors working in the field of
human rights; equally important, the CDDH had to consider ‘the questions dealt with in
[specific] paragraphs’ of  the Brighton Declaration.12
Shortly before the Brighton Conference, the Court submitted a preliminary opinion.13
The opinion clearly emphasised the waves of  reform that had taken place during the past
15 years and saw the Brighton Conference as an opportunity to build on the success and
shortcomings of  Protocol 14, the pilot judgment procedure, and so on and so forth.14 The
preliminary opinion identified the member states as crucial allies in the implementation of
the Convention; dialogue with national courts was enthusiastically encouraged and steps
were proposed in order to deal with inadmissible, repetitive or non-priority cases.15 The aim
of  the Brighton Conference, according to the Court, had to be to secure a ‘manageable’ case
load subject to two conditions: the preservation of  the right to individual petition; and the
promotion of  effective remedies/mechanisms at the national and international level for
cases the Court is not able to deal with.16 In brief, the priority for the ECtHR was the
reduction of  its workload, with a view to safeguarding its efficiency and ultimately its
legitimacy vis-à-vis citizens/petitioners.
In a somewhat different vein, the Brighton Declaration departed from the ‘reform’
discourse, underlining the centrality of  the subsidiarity principle and the sovereignty of  the
parties to the Convention:
The States Parties and the Court share responsibility for realising the effective
implementation of  the Convention, underpinned by the fundamental principle of
subsidiarity. The Convention was concluded on the basis, inter alia, of  the
sovereign equality of  States. States Parties must respect the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Convention, and must effectively resolve violations at the
national level. The Court acts as a safeguard for violations that have not been
remedied at the national level. Where the Court finds a violation, States Parties
must abide by the final judgment of  the Court.17
The responsibility of  states to comply with the judgments of  the Court was still duly
stressed. However, it is at point 12 of  the Declaration that one finds a clear invitation to the
Court to refer to the subsidiarity principle and to the margin of  appreciation doctrine, and
to amend the Convention’s Preamble accordingly:
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The Conference therefore:
a) Welcomes the development by the Court in its case law of  principles such as
subsidiarity and the margin of  appreciation, and encourages the Court to give
great prominence to and apply consistently these principles in its judgments; 
b) Concludes that, for reasons of  transparency and accessibility, a reference to
the principle of  subsidiarity and the doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation as
developed in the Court’s case law should be included in the Preamble to the
Convention . . . 
The above was confirmed by the Explanatory Report to Protocol 15,18 which, apart from
the abovementioned points 3 and 12 of  the Brighton Declaration, explicitly referred (in fact
reproduced, at point 9) to point 11 of  the Declaration as well:
The jurisprudence of  the Court makes clear that the States Parties enjoy a margin
of  appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, depending on
the circumstances of  the case and the rights and freedoms engaged. This reflects
that the Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of  human rights at
national level and that national authorities are in principle better placed than an
international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. The margin of
appreciation goes hand in hand with supervision under the Convention system.
In this respect, the role of  the Court is to review whether decisions taken by
national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having due regard to the
State’s margin of  appreciation.
Thus, the above paragraph underlined that the Court should have ‘due regard’ to the margin
of  appreciation; in addition, the reference to the link between subsidiarity and the margin
of  appreciation is evident.
The Explanatory Report also referred to the ‘transparency and accessibility’ of  the
principle of  subsidiarity and the margin of  appreciation, ‘these characteristics of  the
Convention system’;19 this was also inspired by the Brighton Declaration and the proposals
contained therein, suggesting that the visibility of  remedies at the national level should be
increased.20 Another message stemming from these terms is that the reformulation of  the
Preamble will incite applicants to exhaust national remedies before turning to Strasbourg,21
and thus the overall amount of  inadmissible applications solely on the grounds of  lack of
compliance with the exhaustion rule will be reduced. Importantly, the Explanatory Report
pointed out that the new Recital aims at incorporating the margin of  appreciation doctrine
‘as developed by the Court in its case law’.22
As to the views of  the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights noted that ‘the proposed changes to the text are principally of  a technical
and uncontroversial nature’, and states were therefore urged to proceed with all the
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appropriate steps so as to speed up the process of  ratification.23 In its Report, the
Committee reacted to member states’ preoccupation with criticism of  the Court by stating
that the implementation ‘of  Convention standards in States Parties’ is equally important, in
that ‘[s]tressing the need to reform – and criticising – the [ECtHR] tends to mislead the
public by suggesting that reform of  the Court alone is needed’.24
Taking into consideration the aforementioned official positions of  the Strasbourg organs
and especially of  the ECtHR, one concludes that the Protocol essentially attempts to
distinguish responsibilities and reaffirm member states’ crucial role in the prevention of
human rights violations or their elimination at the national level. In fact, the Court’s view,
expressed via its preliminary opinion, almost endorses this approach as a means of  reducing
the perennial problem of  its increasing workload. It is therefore evident that, generally, the
Strasbourg institutions viewed Protocol 15 as part of  a broader reform agenda, whereby the
amendments contained in the Preamble would be of  a primarily technical nature. It is in the
Brighton Declaration that we find the firmest references to states’ sovereignty, and it is
worth examining this matter in detail.
a REsPoNsE to HIRst (No 2) ?
This section examines whether the first Article of  Protocol 15 could also be attributed to
British anxieties concerning an increasingly activist Court. One rather influential line of
argumentation in the UK has it that, although human rights are universal in their
conception, their application and implementation should best be left to the ‘hands’ of
national authorities and courts.25 This is not a recent development. It should be
remembered that, in his well-known dissenting opinion in Golder, Fitzmaurice concluded in
1975 as follows: ‘[i]f  the right [of  access to courts] does not find a place in Article 6.1, it
clearly does not find a place anywhere in the Convention. This is no doubt a serious
deficiency that ought to be put right. But it is a task for the contracting states to accomplish,
and for the Court to refer to them, not seek to carry out itself.’26
A number of  interesting deductions stem from the preparatory work of  the CDDH and
its Committee of  Experts, demonstrating that the reality behind the adoption of
Protocol 15 is somewhat more complicated when compared to the approach taken by the
Court and the Parliamentary Assembly post-Brighton, but before the adoption of  the final
text. First, during its meeting in June 2012, the CDDH acknowledged that only Article 1 of
the forthcoming Protocol would be a ‘challenging’ amendment; the remaining amendments
were viewed as ‘relatively straightforward’.27 It was also added that the new text ‘should stay
within the consensus of  the Brighton Declaration, respect the balance of  the existing
preamble and be comprehensible to the general public’.28 Second, the Report produced by
the Committee of  Experts in October 2012 clearly referred to ‘potentially conflicting
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positions’ concerning the first Article, and concluded that the final text sought to serve a
number of  interconnected aims: to refrain from defining relevant terms, possibly with a
view to leaving this task to the Court; and, by doing so, to avoid presenting the Court as the
‘originator of  the doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation’ and to avoid ‘refer[ring] to the role
of  the Court in relation to the margin of  appreciation’.29 Equally important, the Committee
did not accept proposals to include the phrases ‘subsidiarity in the interpretation of  the
Convention’ and ‘a margin of  appreciation in executing Court judgments’.30 In addition, the
ECtHR’s opinion of  6 February 2013 on Article 1 of  the Protocol (that is, after the final
text was agreed – reference to this opinion is also made below) not only underlined a
preference, on the part of  the Court, to refer to the margin of  appreciation ‘as developed
by the Court in its case law’, but it also confirmed that the text was the product of  a
‘compromise’ in order to facilitate an agreement.31
The submissions by pertinent civil society actors on Protocol 15 ECHR should also be
taken into consideration. A significant number of  NGOs published a joint statement in
June 2013, underlining that this Protocol ‘must not be allowed to result in a weakening of
the Convention system and human rights protection in Europe’.32 Moreover, the NGOs
favoured a more balanced drafting of  the Preamble, notably one that would explicitly refer
to other interpretative principles developed by the Court, such as the proportionality
principle, the interpretation of  the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ or the ‘principle that
rights must be practical and effective rather than theoretical and illusory’.33 These views
were also endorsed by the European Group of  National Human Rights Institutions.34
The UK signed the Protocol on the day it was opened for signature and informed the
CDDH that ‘it attaches great importance to Protocol 15’ and hopes that ‘all States Parties
will sign and ratify it as soon as possible so that the measures agreed in the Brighton
Declaration may be rapidly implemented’.35 Simultaneously, a press release issued by the
UK Ministry of  Justice emphasised that the Court’s reform decided during the Brighton
Conference and the subsequent adoption of  the Protocol ‘was one of  the key priorities for
the UK’s chairmanship of  the Council of  Europe’ and, furthermore, that the new package
entails that ‘[t]he court will not normally intervene where national courts have clearly
applied the Convention properly’; lastly, it was mentioned that ‘the Court should not
routinely overturn the decisions made by national authorities’.36 The press release was, of
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Convention on Human Rights’ 7 June 2013, CDDH(2013)015, 2–3. The Parliamentary Assembly in its
opinion of  26 April 2013 emphasised as well that the reference to the doctrine of  margin of  appreciation
should be understood ‘as developed by the Court’s case law’; ibid 5.
32 Joint NGO Statement, ‘Protocol 15 to the European Convention on Human Rights Must not Result in a
Weakening of  Human Rights Protection’ (2013) <www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR61/007/2013/en>
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33 Ibid 2. The ‘living instrument’ method has enabled the Court to adopt a dynamic interpretation, taking into
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‘new technologies or . . . social change’. See Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the Legitimacy of  the European Court of
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GDR(2012)012, 2.
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course, a political document directed mainly at the national audience or part thereof. Still,
the statement by the UK Ministry of  Justice aligns with a significant number of  warning
signs delivered by the current UK government and even by members of  the judiciary,
questioning the ambit of  the ECtHR’s authority.37 These signs have recently been
characterised by the incumbent President of  the Court, Dean Spielmann, as disappointing,
given that the UK was one of  the founding states of  the Council of  Europe.38
The current state of  human rights affairs in the UK is primarily characterised by the
balance the Human Rights Act 1998 strikes between the doctrine of  parliamentary
sovereignty39 and the Convention. This is reflected in ss 2–4 of  the Act. The Act essentially
injected ‘fundamental values . . . intrinsic to representative democracy’ in a deeply
‘procedural’ UK constitution, ‘based on a commitment to a particular form of
representative majoritarian democracy and responsible government’.40 Section 2(1) imposes
an obligation upon UK courts and tribunals to ‘take into account’ any judgment or opinion
of  the ECtHR. Section 3(1) states that ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation
and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights’. If  this is not possible and regarding primary legislation only, s 4(2),
read in conjunction with s 4(1), empowers certain high-ranking courts to issue a declaration
of  incompatibility. The exact ambit of  these sections or the Act itself  is a question open to
debate. With respect to the fairly contentious s 2(1), for example, Clayton reads that section
as leaving it to the courts to decide ‘the weight to be given to the Strasbourg jurisprudence’,
not least since ‘it was not the government’s intention to require the domestic courts to be
bound by Strasbourg decisions’.41 For Sales, the so-called ‘mirror principle’ implies that UK
courts should generally – but not always – follow judgments of  the Strasbourg Court, unless
there are convincing reasons for them to do otherwise; this means that, although the
discretion as to the weight ultimately remains with the courts, Parliament’s intention was
that ‘the weight to be given to [Strasbourg jurisprudence] should be great’.42
The law is, of  course, evolving through the UK courts’ jurisprudence, which cannot be
discussed here extensively.43 Suffice it to briefly refer to the well-known views of  Lord
Bingham in Ullah: ‘[t]he duty of  national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
37 See ‘European Court is not Superior to UK Supreme Court, says Lord Judge’ The Guardian (London 2013)
<www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/04/european-court-uk-supreme-lord-judge> accessed 30 March
2015.
38 BBC, Hardtalk – Dean Spielmann <www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3cstljm> accessed 24 June 2015. Along
similar lines, former President Bratza found ‘deeply regrettable’ the proposals within the UK to withdraw
from the ECHR; Nicolas Bratza, ‘The Relationship between the UK Courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] European
Human Rights Law Review 505, 506.
39 It is needless to point out that the Diceyan ‘orthodoxy’ is facing increasing challenges, including from the
Human Rights Act 1998; see, for example, John McGarry, ‘The Principle of  Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2012)
32 Legal Studies 577; Anthony Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of  Parliament – Form or Substance?’ in Jeffrey Jowell
and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (OUP 2011) 35; R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL
56; or the very recent case R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 (the ‘black spider memos’), which will
no doubt prompt further reflections on the relevancy of  the traditional understanding of  parliamentary
sovereignty. For a more reconciliatory approach compare, however, Michael Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty
in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart 2015).
40 David Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act and Constitutional Principles’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies 165, 166.
41 Richard Clayton, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The Human Rights Act and the Impact of  Strasbourg Case Law’ [2012]
Public Law 639, 640–1.
42 Philip Sales, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: A Response to Lord Irvine’ [2012] Public
Law 253, 255–8.
43 See, in this respect, Sales (n 42); Clayton (n 41); Bratza (n 38); Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Human Rights Law in the
UK – Is There a Need for Fundamental Reform?’ [2012] European Human Rights Law Review 595; Francesca
Klug, ‘The Long Road to Human Rights Compliance’ (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 186.
134
jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’;44 or to the statement
(with ‘considerable regret’) by Lord Hoffmann that ‘the United Kingdom is bound by the
Convention, as a matter of  international law, to accept the decisions of  the ECtHR on its
interpretation’;45 or to the more balanced position in Manchester City Council v Pinnock that
the UK Supreme Court is not ‘bound to follow every decision of  the [ECtHR]’, but
[w]here, however, there is a clear and constant line of  decisions whose effect is
not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of
[UK] law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand
some argument or point of  principle, we consider that it would be wrong for [the
UK Supreme Court] not to follow that line.46
This meticulously drafted balance is presently experiencing an unmatched degree of
scrutiny47 due to – among other cases – one (controversial, for some) decision of  the
ECtHR. In the well-known Hirst (No 2) case, the Strasbourg Court held that the blanket ban
on voting rights imposed upon all prisoners was disproportionate and inconsistent with the
right to vote, as guaranteed by Article 3 of  Protocol 1 ECHR.48 Putting aside the discussion
of  the case in the media, Hirst (No 2) was met with varying reactions from the UK courts
and the UK Parliament, the latter being split into three groups: the first group stressed the
importance of  complying with international law and effectively respecting the rule of  law;
the second group favoured the sovereignty of  Parliament and eyed Strasbourg as a threat;
and yet another favoured extensive deliberation on this issue as a means of  influencing the
European Court.49 But it was only after Hirst (No 2) that a major debate on the relationship
between the Convention and the domestic legal order took place in Westminster, which,
according to Bates, cannot but suggest that the progressively expanding jurisdiction of  the
Court before that case was duly accepted on the basis of  a ‘political calculation’ by
successive UK governments, although the consequences of  this ‘commitment’ were
occasionally viewed as ‘unwelcome’.50
One line of  argument on why the ECtHR overstepped its authority was that Article 3
of  Protocol 1 ECHR does not grant universal suffrage, but is destined at guaranteeing a
specific democratic procedure.51 This is flawed, not least since it is in clear contrast to the
Court’s expressly adopted view since 1987.52 However, criticism has been levelled against
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44 R (on the Application of  Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, para 20.
45 Secretary of  State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28, para 70; regret was expressed because the
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48 Hirst v UK (No 2), App no 74025/01, 6 October 2005, paras 76–85. See also s 3 of  the Representation of  the
People Act 1983. Importantly, however, the Court left it to the UK to decide how, under its wide margin of
appreciation, it will implement this judgment and comply with Article P1–3; see paras 83–4.
49 Sophie Briant, ‘Dialogue, Diplomacy and Defiance: Prisoners’ Voting Rights at Home and in Strasbourg’
[2011] European Human Rights Law Review 243, 250. 
50 Ed Bates, ‘British Sovereignty and the European Court of  Human Rights’ (2012) Law Quarterly Review 382,
406–7.
51 David Davis, ‘Britain Must Defy the European Court of  Human Rights on Prisoner Voting as Strasbourg is
Exceeding its Authority’ in Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart and Julie Fraser (eds), The European Court of  Human
Rights and its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar 2013) 67–8.
52 See Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, App no 9267/81, 2 March 1987. For some discussion on the travaux
préparatoires behind Article P1–3, see Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘Mapping the Jurisdiction of  the European Court of
Human Rights further to the “Reasonable Intervals” Clause of  the Right to Free Elections’ [2013] European
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the Court from outside the UK as well. Zwart considers, for instance, that the case was
an instance where the ECtHR pursued a strategy to target a highly compliant state so as
to increase the overall boundaries of  protection, especially because prisoners lack the
right to vote in other contracting states as well.53 In any case, the fact remains that, in light
of  strong domestic opposition, the UK government has yet to implement the ECtHR’s
decision.54
Another – interconnected with Brighton – manifestation of  the British anxieties vis-à-
vis the Strasbourg Court is the UK government’s persistence in drafting its own Bill of
Rights, an idea that would, in all probability, amount to the repeal of  the Human Rights Act
1998.55 The independent Commission on a Bill of  Rights, appointed to examine this
possibility, submitted its final report in December 2012; the majority of  members found
that ‘there is a strong argument in favour of  a UK Bill of  Rights’, but two members opined
otherwise as they were not convinced that there are flaws in the way the Human Rights Act
1998 currently operates and is applied by the domestic courts.56 Individual members openly
denounced the ECtHR on the grounds of  Hirst (No 2) and the ‘judicially activist approach’
taken by Strasbourg ‘in the last 30 years’, which undermines – according to the authors –
‘the democratically expressed will of  Parliament’.57 Many have criticised the necessity or the
motives behind such a move: Elliott argues, for example, that, regardless of  the content of
the list of  rights contained in a possible new Act, the adoption of  a mechanism which
would ‘[make] more difficult the vindication of  extant legal rights by requiring litigants more
frequently to traverse the road to Strasbourg’ is perfectly imaginable.58 For Harvey, the
process is primarily informed by an ‘inward looking’ agenda, which does not pay sufficient
attention to the complexities of  the UK’s constitutional design.59
a ComPRomIsE, LEaVINg oPEN QUEstIoNs of INtERPREtatIoN
The above analysis reveals that the Brighton Declaration and the subsequent Protocol 15
should be viewed as a story of  competing interests leading to a compromise. The ‘reform’
discourse advanced by the Court and the Parliamentary Assembly had to be reconciled with
British concerns about an increasingly ‘activist’ Court.60 This is not unfamiliar territory for
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the Convention.61 What remains to be assessed, though, is whether and to what extent the
final text reflects such a compromise, or whether the actual solution might be more
promising for the Court than its critics imagined.
2 three elements of article 1 of Protocol 15 in context
tHE maRgIN of aPPRECIatIoN
The new Preamble will state that the contracting parties ‘enjoy a margin of  appreciation’. It
is therefore appropriate to provide some clarification as to the meaning and scope of  this
term. The margin of  appreciation doctrine generally places the Court in a position to ask a
number of  questions, including the following: when exactly are restrictions to a right
necessary in a democratic society? When does the legislation under examination go below
the common standards in most European countries? When may these restrictions not be
justified with reference to the constitutional and historical background of  the respondent
state?62 The doctrine takes other ‘manifestations’ as well, including ‘the Court’s respect for
the facts as established by the domestic courts or their interpretation of  domestic law’.63
The doctrine is irrelevant for specific Convention rights, a point which is returned to below.
For Arai-Takahashi, the proportionality principle and the doctrine possibly interact: ‘[t]he
more intense the standard of  proportionality becomes, the narrower the margin allowed to
national authorities’.64
Some commentators consider that the Strasbourg Court could provide further
guidance as to the use and application of  this doctrine. Letsas invited the Court to
distinguish between the ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ use of  the margin of  appreciation,
namely between cases where ‘the applicant did not, as a matter of  human rights, have the
right he or she claimed’, and cases where the ECtHR ‘will not substantively review the
decision of  national authorities as to whether there has been a violation’.65 For the
ECtHR’s President, the application of  the doctrine is indeed ‘predictable only to a certain
degree’, but this is inevitable as the facts and the legal framework of  the case are of
utmost importance: the margin ‘is not a fixed unit of  legal measurement[,] [n]or is it
applied at the Court’s own pleasure’.66
In an effort to apply the proportionality principle consistently, the ECtHR will often
seek for – what is termed as – the European consensus, the identification of  pan-European
legal agreement on a – frequently – sensitive or controversial matter. The interpretative
instrument of  European consensus could also benefit from a precise definition, on the part
of  the Court, in order to unravel its true legitimising factor and to bring about ‘clarity and
foreseeability to case law in relation to almost all Convention rights’.67
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To the possible surprise of  many contemporary critics of  the Court, the ECtHR had to
deal with certain rather severe allegations during the 1990s, including from UK politicians,
all centring on the tenet that it was relying too much on the margin of  appreciation the
contracting parties enjoy.68 Thus, the Court was accused inter alia of  ‘denial of  justice’,
‘resignation’, ‘opportunism’ and avoiding adjudication in sensitive cases.69
If  one now considers the amended text of  the Preamble, the first thing to be noted is
that the new formulation departs from the initial intention to refer to the term ‘considerable
margin of  appreciation’.70 In addition, as discussed above, the Explanatory Report
highlighted that the margin of  appreciation is dependent on the facts of  the case and the
rights in question.71 Equally important, according to the explanatory text, the notion of
margin of  appreciation should be understood in line with the Strasbourg case law.72 This
qualification does not feature in the text of  the new preambulary paragraph. The ECtHR
was quick to note that, although the text is incomplete, and ‘could give rise to uncertainty
as to its intended meaning’, the fact that ‘the drafters’ intentions have been clarified’ was not
without legal consequences.73 The Court added, in particular, that the Explanatory Report,
as well as the documents prepared under the CDDH, ‘[form] part of  the travaux préparatoires
of  the Protocol and thus [are] relevant to its interpretation’.74 The Joint NGO Statement
also observed that the subordination of  the doctrine to the ECtHR’s interpretative practices
entails a confirmation of  specific principles: ‘the Court has always accepted that the
doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation does not apply at all in respect of  some rights, such
as freedom from torture and other ill-treatment’.75 The Strasbourg Court arguably believed
that the inclusion of  the phrase ‘as developed by the Court’s case law’ would recognise the
‘provenance of  the margin of  appreciation’,76 but the CDDH refrained from developing the
text further.
The removal of  the term ‘considerable’ is noteworthy because the Court itself  on a
number of  occasions has recognised that the extent of  the states’ discretion is significant.
To take the example of  the abovementioned prisoners’ right to vote, in Mathieu-Mohin the
ECtHR accepted that the contracting parties ‘have a wide margin of  appreciation in this
sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of
Protocol No. 1 (P1) have been complied with’.77 Still, the omission of  the term
‘considerable’ may not be overstressed; the doctrine interacts78 with the subsidiarity
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principle, enabling the Court to essentially entrust the protection of  a specific right (or the
justification of  its restriction) to the domestic order and, in particular, the domestic courts.
sUBsIdIaRIty
It would not be hyperbole to suggest that the ECtHR more often than not ‘treasures’ the
notion of  subsidiarity. Subsidiarity has various meanings.79 The principle indeed
penetrates in a number of  ways the Convention, the Court’s function and the
implementation of  its decisions. The classic understanding of  subsidiarity in the
Convention machinery is the exhaustion of  domestic remedies rule; otherwise, the
application is considered inadmissible.80 Moreover, although the extent of  the margin of
appreciation is primarily defined by the matter/case at hand and the right in question,81
subsidiarity may also be viewed as granting contracting parties greater discretion: this was
duly acknowledged by the Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 and the Brighton
Declaration.82 Further, subsidiarity is pivotal for the enforcement of  the ECtHR’s
judgments;83 this entails not only that states parties have a number of  options as to ‘how
to fulfil their obligations under the Convention’,84 but also that they are encouraged to
‘develop domestic capacities and mechanisms to ensure the rapid execution of  the Court’s
judgments’.85 In addition, subsidiarity presupposes prevention at the domestic level,
including the establishment of  appropriate legal remedies.86 The new Preamble aptly
reflects this tenet, since the ‘primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms’ rests
with states.87 In a formulation echoing s 2 of  the Human Rights Act 1998, the Brighton
Declaration invited national courts and tribunals to ‘take into account the Convention and
the case law of  the Court’.88
Pragmatically, the subsidiarity principle has been employed to justify a number of
reforms seeking to reduce the enormous workload of  the Strasbourg Court. The Court may
have managed to significantly reduce pending cases below the threshold of  100,000,89 but
the problem remains unresolved.
In 2005, Lord Woolf  sent a clear warning sign with his report on the working methods
of  the Court, in which he identified possible reforms that would not require amendments
to the Convention.90 Among others, it was proposed that national extra-judicial institutions
could play a catalyst role in the reduction of  the Court’s workload,91 while the possibility of
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establishing Satellite Offices of  the Registry, especially in countries producing a high
number of  inadmissible complaints, was duly underlined.92 In 2006, another report was
produced by a group of  experts, containing additional recommendations.93 Amendments
to the Convention were not subsequently avoided, and Protocol 14 entered into force
despite the initial Russian opposition.94 According to the President of  the Court, this
Protocol is mainly responsible for the massive reduction in the number of  pending cases.95
It is the severe problem of  the increasing workload96 that has prompted commentary
on the overall constitutional position of  the ECtHR. Has the time come for the Court to
focus on its ‘constitutionalist’ function, that is, ‘clarifying standards, holding states to
account’ or developing rights and standards ‘beyond their literal . . . conceptions’, instead of
its ‘adjudicatory’ one, possibly with the implication of  restraining the right of  individual
petition?97 In their review of  ‘the “official” and the “academic/judicial” debates’ on the
ECtHR’s constitutionalisation, Greer and Wildhaber ‘advocate “constitutional pluralism” as
the best analytical paradigm for the Convention system and also the best framework for the
identification and pursuit of  procedural and other reforms’.98 Other more cautious
approaches favour a more efficient division of  labour between the Grand Chamber and the
Chambers, in order for the right of  individual petition to be maintained, a right that
admittedly preserves the Court’s own legitimacy.99
The Court is well aware of  this debate. In accordance with the ‘reform’ discourse
discussed above, in its opinion before Brighton it realistically acknowledged that there is ‘a
mismatch between the Court’s workload and its capacity’, and that the Convention system
may only be efficient by adopting the principle of  shared responsibility, since ‘[t]he Court
should not in principle, and cannot in practice, bear the full burden of  work generated by
implementation of  the Convention’.100 These considerations demonstrate that the
reference to the subsidiarity principle under Protocol 15 is arguably viewed by the Court as
a positive development.101
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However, this does not mean that the precise ambit of  the term enjoys universal
acceptance. For the Court’s President (citing Handyside),102 the question ‘Subsidiarity to
what?’ necessitates the following answer: ‘[t]o “the national systems safeguarding human
rights”, and not, as some seem to think, to the political will or policy of  the national
authorities’.103 For de Londras, the effectiveness of  the Convention requires ‘a level of
political subsidiarity between the Council of  Europe’s political processes and the Court’, in
the sense that a more robust political supervision of  systemic violations would provide the
Court with sufficient breathing space to deal with its constitutional function.104
oN tHE INCLUsIoN of BotH tERms IN tHE PREamBLE
Elliott observed that the references to the subsidiarity principle and the margin of
appreciation feature in the Preamble and not in the main corpus of  the Convention.105
Indeed, the draft version of  the Declaration, presented in February 2012, stated that the
‘transparency and accessibility of  the principles . . . should be enhanced by their express
inclusion in the Convention’.106
If  the above version of  the Declaration was adopted, the two terms could have been
included in specific Articles of  the Convention or possibly Article 1 ECHR,107 which can
be seen as an expression of  the subsidiarity principle.108 Two questions stem from this
point. First, would it have been preferable if  the references had featured in specific Articles,
for instance, Articles 8–11 of  the Convention, where the Court has employed the margin
of  appreciation doctrine to identify whether interference with these rights may be justified
under public interest grounds?109 Second, would it have been possible to envisage the
insertion of  the clause into the existing Article 1 ECHR?
It is initially essential to remind ourselves of  the importance the Court has attached to
the Preamble of  the Convention. As is well known, the Court follows a contextual
interpretation, suggesting that the Convention should be interpreted as a whole; this is
linked to its approach that the ‘object and purpose’ of  the Convention need to be duly
considered.110 According to the Vienna Convention, which informs the work of  the Court,
‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of  the treaty in their context and in the light of  its object and purposes’
– the Preamble forms part of  the context of  a Treaty.111 Thus, the Preamble ‘articulates
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certain fundamental precepts that the Court has drawn upon when interpreting the
substantive provisions of  the Convention’.112 Judge Rozakis expressed the view that the
current Preamble not only reflects the fact that ‘all the contracting states express their
expectations [therein] and describe their goals to be achieved through the implementation
of  the [Convention’s] provisions’, but also that some terms featuring therein, and notably
‘the achievement of  greater unity’ and ‘the maintenance and further realisation of  Human
Rights’, clearly, ‘and without stretching the meaning of  the words to eccentric results’,
suggest that the drafters had in mind a ‘more ambitious future’ for the Convention.113 Now,
if  one is willing to interpret the Preamble in this vein, one is simultaneously willing to accept
that the ‘post-Protocol 15’ Preamble, featuring the principles of  the margin of  appreciation
and subsidiarity, could perhaps imply a less ambitious future.
Regardless of  the fact that since in its jurisprudence to date the Court has not subjected
Article 1 ECHR to the margin of  appreciation, it is certainly preferable that the doctrine
features in the Preamble, instead of  as part of  Article 1. Indeed, the laconic Article 1
declares the states’ obligation to embed the rights granted by the Convention and it has
been employed by the Court to underline the significance or to delineate the ambit of  other
rights and, more specifically, in order to stress the contracting parties’ positive obligations.114
An insertion of  the doctrine in Article 1 would be in contradiction to the unquestionable
fact that the margin of  appreciation is inapplicable vis-à-vis certain rights or aspects of
rights. Such an insertion could incite respondent states to press for its recognition
throughout the corpus of  – and the rights guaranteed by – the Convention; this would be
a highly unfortunate consequence. Even in that case, the final word on the interpretation of
an amended Article 1 ECHR would, of  course, remain with the Court.
In this regard, it has been noted that Article 1 ECHR is a ‘clear’ expression of  the
subsidiarity principle, granting ‘the primary responsibility’ to member states.115 Indeed, the
Court has confirmed that Article 1, combined with Article 13 ECHR, verifies that ‘[t]he
machinery of  complaint to the Court is . . . subsidiary to national systems safeguarding
human rights’.116 Further, Article 1 has been used to stress the states’ primary responsibility
in the implementation of  judgments and the practical impossibility of  the ECtHR undertaking
this task.117 While the meaning of  the subsidiarity principle is precisely this, one may
consider whether the broad formulation of  Article 1 is a reflection of  the subsidiarity
principle only,118 especially since subsidiarity and the margin of  appreciation doctrine go
hand in hand, and the latter is inapplicable vis-à-vis certain Convention rights. Besides,
Article 1 has been frequently used by the Court to define the territorial scope of  its own
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jurisdiction, including possible extra-territorial obligations of  contracting parties.119
Moreover, one could equally place Article 1 alongside Article 19 ECHR, which establishes
the ECtHR with a mission to ‘ensure the observance of  the engagements undertaken by the
High Contracting Parties’, in other words with a mission to essentially ensure compliance
with the content of  Article 1. Thus, although the primary responsibility remains with the
states, the ECtHR’s pivotal supervisory role is duly stressed under Article 19 of  the
Convention. Lastly, as previously stated, Article 1 has been used by the Court to further
develop or interpret positive obligations. It may therefore be argued that Article 1 serves
multiple purposes, the subsidiarity principle being just one of  them. For these reasons, an
insertion in Article 1 of  the above two terms would be unfortunate.
What remains to be assessed is whether the new Preamble is, from the perspective of
the protection of  human rights, a preferable option when compared to the insertion of  the
terms in specific Articles where the Court has conferred upon contracting parties a margin
of  appreciation. A tentative answer may be endeavoured. If  a possible insertion in specific
Articles (for example, Articles 8–11 or 2 ECHR) would be viewed120 as imposing an
obligation upon the Court to essentially reconsider its current interpretative approach vis-à-
vis the aforementioned Articles possibly with a view to conferring upon states a wider
discretion, then the post-Protocol 15 preambulary paragraph may be seen as expanding the
discretion of  the Court to refer to the principle of  subsidiarity and the margin of
appreciation. Still, since certain Strasbourg judges have attached great importance to the
existing Preamble, notably in order to justify a more dynamic interpretation of  Convention
rights,121 is a more cautious reliance on the Preamble’s updated text to be expected by the
Court, once the ratification of  Protocol 15 takes place? This remains to be seen.
Two further points stemming from the preparatory work to Protocol 15 should also
be discussed. First, it is understood that at least the majority of  judges at the ECtHR
would prefer a Convention (including its Preamble) which did not contain any reference
to the margin of  appreciation.122 Clearly, this was politically not feasible, a point the
Court was fully aware of. It is sufficient to consider, in this respect, the Brighton opening
address of  the UK Lord Chancellor and Secretary of  State for Justice: ‘we hope to get an
agreement that makes clear that the protection of  human rights goes hand-in-hand with
democracy and the role of  democratically-elected national parliaments’.123 The inclusion
in the Preamble should therefore be viewed as (yet another) compromise between two
positions: the inclusion in the main body of  the Convention and the overall omission of
such a reference.
Second, concerning subsidiarity, the work of  the CDDH demonstrates that the
Strasbourg Court secured a number of  (legally) important things: the avoidance of  phrasing
such as ‘subsidiarity in the interpretation of  the Convention’, and the lack of  a definition
(in the Convention) of  the term subsidiarity.124 The discretion granted to the Court, in this
respect, is considerable. As the President of  the Parliamentary Assembly put it during the
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Brighton Conference, the limit to subsidiarity is the effectiveness of  the available machinery
at the national level and, in any event, the last word remains with the Court.125 Accordingly,
for Judge Bratza, subsidiarity ‘can never totally exclude review by the Court. It cannot in any
circumstances confer what one might call blanket immunity.’126
In order to assess the overall position of  the Strasbourg Court post-Protocol 15, it is
now appropriate to examine the last phrase of  the new preambulary paragraph.
tHE sUPERVIsoRy jURIsdICtIoN of tHE ECtHR
The provision in the Convention’s new Preamble that the margin of  appreciation is ‘subject
to the supervisory jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Human Rights’ deserves to be
stressed. That is so because it will be the first time that the Convention itself  will explicitly
reflect the Strasbourg jurisprudential principle that the margin of  appreciation doctrine is
subject to the Court’s scrutiny.
It should be remembered that the Explanatory Report states that the doctrine ‘goes
hand in hand with supervision’ and ‘[i]n this respect, the role of  the Court is to review
whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having
due regard to the State’s margin of  appreciation’.127 The Brighton Declaration pushed for
a somewhat different formulation as it ‘welcome[d] the development by the Court in its case
law of  principles such as subsidiarity and the margin of  appreciation, and encourage[d] the
Court to give great prominence and apply consistently these principles in its judgments’.128 This
is not surprising, in light of  the aforementioned dual rationale behind the initiatives leading
to the adoption of  the Protocol. However, the terms ‘great prominence’ and ‘apply
consistently’ are not found in the Explanatory Report or, of  course, in the new Preamble.
It is not difficult to imagine that respondent states will attempt to rely on the new
Preamble as a means of  solidifying their argumentation and justifying proportionate, in
their view, restrictions to rights guaranteed by the Convention. In that case, the ECtHR
might be convinced to respond to a consistent academic call and provide a more elaborate
definition of  the margin of  appreciation doctrine. This is an additional angle to the
reference to ‘transparency’ advanced by the Brighton Declaration.129
Regardless of  this, the last phrase of  the new Preamble serves essentially as a safeguard
for the Court: no matter how elaborate a definition it provides, the Court is expected to
hold firmly the status quo, namely its maintenance of  the final word on states’ discretion.
The precise formulation of  the phrase prompts further consideration. It can be argued
that, had the sovereign states not wished to allow the Court a ‘supervisory jurisdiction’ on
the margin of  appreciation, this particular phrase could have been omitted from the new
paragraph. Put differently, while proponents of  the Court might have wished for an
inclusion, next to the margin of  appreciation doctrine, of  the phrase ‘as developed by the
Court’s case law’, and for good reasons,130 one wonders whether the new text actually
provides the Court with a lot more than this, given that it now has explicitly under the
Convention the final say on this very matter. And, as highlighted above, it is arguably one
thing if  the Court itself  confines the margin of  appreciation doctrine to its overall
supervision through its jurisprudence, and quite another if  this confinement stems directly from
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the Convention . The time that will elapse until the ratification of  Protocol 15 will enable the
Strasbourg Court to realise that a more ‘developed text’131 concerning the margin of
appreciation would not necessarily be preferable to the existing explicit reference in the
Preamble that the doctrine is subject to its supervision. The above analysis demonstrates that
the Court is possibly concerned with a number of  issues, including the following: that the
provenance of  the doctrine is unclear under Protocol 15; and that the States might heavily
invoke the margin of  appreciation, questioning its context-dependent nature and its
inapplicability vis-à-vis specific Convention rights. The first point to be considered, in this
respect, is that it is the ECtHR that will interpret the new Preamble, including the terms
mentioned therein. The lack of  a definition in the Convention of  the doctrine and the
presence of  the phrase ‘as developed by the Court in its case-law’ in the Explanatory Report
could easily enable the Court to deal with these concerns. Second, and equally important, a
more ‘developed text’ in the Preamble under the aforementioned terms132 could be viewed
as limiting the Court’s discretion: in that case, the ECtHR would need to follow its
established case law on the margin of  appreciation, however fragmented or uncertain it has
been characterised as. Under the existing formulation, the Court has an additional strategic
option at its disposal: to further limit the states’ discretion (that is, to review its case law on
the margin of  appreciation) because the doctrine operates in the Convention subject to its
jurisdiction. As is well known, while the Court takes into due consideration previous case law,
it is not formally bound by precedent.
The ECtHR is fully aware, of  course, of  the discussions on its legitimacy133 and may
not be expected to embark on such a risky and expansive approach any time soon. Thus, it
could be claimed that the above reflections are mainly legalistic in their nature, adhere too
much to the final text, and do not pay sufficient attention to its background. However, it is
important to underline that the new Preamble may be employed by the Court to defend its
own legitimacy, while maintaining the same balanced134 approach to its interpretation. Put
simply, the Court could merely reiterate pacta sunt servanda, in other words, that it was ‘the
will of  democratic states’ to sign the treaty135 and grant the Court the supervisory role and,
therefore, the development and application of  the margin of  appreciation.
In any event, it is not possible to predict with absolute certainty the actual stance of  the
Court when it will be called upon to interpret the Preamble. The President of  the Court,
discussing possible developments on the margin of  appreciation doctrine after Protocol 15,
has given some early signs, observing that:
[w]ithout prejudging – or even predicting – how exactly the Court will interpret
the new provision when the time finally comes, the signs so far are that it will not
be regarded as modifying the basis of  the Court’s review, laid down in the case-
law of  many years.136
This issue is returned to in the following section.
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In addition, the last phrase of  the new Preamble places the Court in the strategic
position to make use of  the subsidiarity principle and the margin of  appreciation doctrine
to overcome perennial shortcomings of  the machinery. For instance, the Court may refer
to the subsidiarity principle so as to press for the enforcement of  its judgments at the
national level. Such an attitude would complement approaches favouring an increased
diplomatic involvement from the Committee of  Ministers.137 The institutional reality
remains that the Strasbourg Court, no matter how creatively it may use the Preamble, can
only achieve so much in the field of  implementation without the support of  the Committee
and, perhaps more importantly, of  the national authorities. It is well-known that the
enforcement regime is not always effective, especially with regard to persistently non-
compliant states and the prevention of  consistent breaches.138 Recent research, however,
presents a more optimistic picture as the influential Secretariat of  the Council of  Europe
uses ‘interpretive and monitoring tasks . . . to ensure the even-handed and impartial
implementation of  Court judgments’.139
3 three (not necessarily divergent) directions for Protocol 15
Although one has to be fully aware of  the limitations involved in assessing the direction of
a Protocol not yet ratified by all the contracting parties, the above analysis enables us to
formulate a number of  possible (but not necessarily divergent) directions that may be taken.
These are based on three initial remarks: (i) a Protocol containing such sensitive and
controversial terms, adopted further to laborious negotiations by states and institutions with
different priorities, cannot evade legal developments; (ii) the final word on the interpretation
of  the Protocol, including the new preambulary paragraph, cannot but remain with the
ECtHR; but the latter (iii) is well aware of  the discussions concerning its legitimacy,
including the fact that the Protocol was essentially the product of  the Brighton Declaration.
To begin with the most unlikely scenario, the new Protocol might be used by the
Court to expand its supervisory jurisdiction with a view to reducing the states’ margin of
appreciation as applied so far. Although the text could legally support such an approach,
this should be considered as improbable, for reasons explained in more detail below and
relating to its legitimacy. Second, the new Preamble may be used by states to expand their
margin of  appreciation. The final text does not guarantee any success in such efforts,
since it clearly refers to the supervisory jurisdiction of  the Court and since the margin of
appreciation doctrine does not feature, for example, in Article 1 ECHR. However, the
positive consequence of  a possible eagerness of  certain respondent states to cite the new
Preamble might be the much awaited clarification by the Court of  the precise ambit of
the margin of  appreciation doctrine. Third, the new Preamble may be cited by the Court
to point out the states’ primary responsibility in the implementation of  its judgments or
their responsibility to establish or improve domestic remedies for the protection of
Convention rights. The Court was not hostile to the inclusion of  the term ‘subsidiarity’
in the Preamble, while also viewing Brighton as part of  the reform agenda. This scenario
is therefore probable.
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Lastly, given that the amended Preamble is the outcome of  two competing tendencies
(on the one hand, the position of  the Strasbourg institutions, and especially the ECtHR,
and, on the other, the aspirations of  certain states, and notably the UK), one thing is certain:
the two tendencies will play their own roles once the issue of  its interpretation surfaces.
Concluding remarks
This article explored the background to the adoption of  Protocol 15 ECHR and assessed
its main features. The focus was on Article 1 of  the Protocol, which includes an explicit
reference to the principle of  subsidiarity and the doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation. It
was shown that the Preamble is the product of  a compromise between two competing
tendencies: on the one hand, the Strasbourg institutions, led by the ECtHR, stressed the
reform agenda and placed the Protocol in the context of  the reduction in the ECtHR’s
workload; on the other, certain governments, led by the UK, saw in the new Protocol an
opportunity for judicial restraint or an answer to their anxieties concerning an increasingly
activist Court, in accordance with the ongoing debate on the Court’s legitimacy.
The remainder of  this article considered the text of  the new preambulary paragraph. It
was observed that the new Preamble will by no means impose any duty upon the ECtHR
to modify its interpretative methods, notably by lowering the standards of  human rights
protection it has developed over time (which only serve as the minimum standard of
protection). It ultimately rests upon the Court to decide when and how it may resort to the
new Preamble to essentially confirm that the margin of  appreciation doctrine and the
subsidiarity principle operate subject to the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Put differently,
the new preambulary paragraph fails to impose limitations on the ECtHR’s existing
interpretative practices. More specifically, whereas currently the ECtHR confines the margin
of  appreciation doctrine to its overall supervision through its jurisprudence, once Protocol 15
is in force, the new Preamble will imply that this confinement stems directly from the
Convention. This means that a more adventurous avenue to be taken by the Court would be
to further substantiate its supervisory realm via Protocol 15, in a sufficiently opportune
political setting. If  the leading role of  the UK government in the drafting of  preparatory
documents behind the adoption of  the Protocol is taken into consideration, one can expect
the existing momentum to clearly point in a different direction.
Inversely, it cannot be excluded that the contracting parties or at least some of  them will
see in the new Preamble an opportunity to question any further or even existing limitations
to their margin of  appreciation, in which case the Court might be forced to clarify more
precisely the ambit of  the doctrine. This would be a positive development serving legal
certainty. Lastly, the Court could also see in the Preamble an opportunity to stress
subsidiarity in the execution of  judgments, much in line with its own discourse before and
after the Brighton Declaration which, as explained in this article, focused on the reform of
the Convention machinery.
Protocol 15 may not be instantly viewed as a substantial revision of  the Convention, but
it is far from certain that its nature is simply ‘technical and uncontroversial’, as no doubt
strategically the Parliamentary Assembly suggested. Once in force, it may prompt analogous
discussions to the ones currently taking place concerning, for example, s 2 of  the Human
Rights Act 1998, namely debates concerning the ambit of  human rights protection and the
role of  courts – national, supranational or international – in such a protection. In this
perennial constitutional question, arguments regarding the ECtHR’s legitimacy – a fairly
recent academic debate – will come into play yet again.
The judges of  the ECtHR have certainly engaged in the aforementioned legitimacy
debate, and rightly so, but one thing should be stressed: the ECtHR needs to underline with
When ‘reform’ meets ‘judicial restraint’ 147
sufficient clarity that the question of  its legitimacy may not be employed à la carte, in other
words, whenever Strasbourg is not producing a desirable outcome for the respondent.140 To
return to an aforementioned example, could it really be ignored that the interpretation of
Article 3 of  Protocol 1 as a provision granting an individual right to vote took place in 1987,141
and not in 2005, when Hirst (No 2) was decided? If  so, why was the legitimacy question
raised after that specific case?142 One has to be clear: the ECtHR promotes an
understanding of  democracy (or democratic values) whereby the rule of  law is an essential,
if  not inherent, feature, and ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’ are prerequisites, to
the extent that the majority may not always prevail.143 And the debate is, in fact, similar to
the debates taking place within the confines of  a national legal order: the Convention in
‘certain domains’ ‘disables democratic discretion’ (understood as majority rule) to ensure the
respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in some other areas it leaves a ‘permissible
spectrum’ to national authorities.144 The idea that democracy as majority rule could go as
far as undermining fundamental or minority rights is not only outdated, but also contrary
to equality,145 an essential precondition for contemporary democratic states which are not
or should not be concerned solely with the proper functioning of  majority rule within the
political system.146 It is in the late twentieth century that we find approaches stressing the
non-antagonistic, but ‘mutually reinforcing nature of  rights and democracy’.147 That said, it is
unavoidable that the European or national judge might sometimes fail to strike the right
balance, as it is unavoidable that the legislature might at some point produce bad laws; but
it is only through this constructive interaction, whereby democracy and the rule of  law are
mutually dependent, that citizens can benefit the most.
To be sure, the Court is not expected to disregard the surrounding ‘legitimacy’ discourse
and attempt a ‘dynamic’ interpretation of  the new Preamble in the foreseeable future,
although strictly legally it may be possible for it to do so. The ECtHR is certainly aware that
the main issue to be resolved is its workload. It is to this area that efforts should be geared,
and this perhaps explains why the Strasbourg actors and notably the Court, pre and post-
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Brighton, have used the ‘reform’ line of  argumentation to justify the insertion of  the
subsidiarity principle.
In this vein, Protocol 15 may also be expected to feature in forthcoming discussions on
a mutually constructive dialogue between the Strasbourg judges and the highest domestic
judges and courts,148 including in the UK, where common law still maintains its distinctive
characteristics.149 This dialogue necessarily presupposes that the ECtHR will duly consider
the domestic input as well; the R v Horncastle150 and Al-Khawaja151 cases constitute an
indicative example of  such a stance.152
To conclude, one could accept that the Brighton Conference – at least insofar as the
approach taken by the UK government is concerned – was another ‘manifestation of  a
specific, and influential, strand within politico-legal discourse in the United Kingdom . . .
characterised by a deep antipathy towards legal control of  political . . . authority in general,
and external –“European” – legal control in particular’, in other words, a manifestation of
‘a deep-seated commitment to the notion of  the political constitution’.153 This contribution
argues that the final, adopted text of  Protocol 15 does not reduce the intensity of  this
‘external’ control. The position of  the Strasbourg Court within the Convention is to secure
minimum standards of  protection of  human rights, while granting states an – oftentimes
wide – margin of  discretion. Even if  Protocol 15 might have been presented to the UK
audience as a supposed reduction in the ECtHR’s jurisdictional realm, a closer look at the
new preambulary paragraph does not support such an approach. As the title of  this
contribution suggests, Protocol 15 might have been a constructive ‘meeting’ between
Strasbourg voices pressing for reform and efficiency and certain states’ voices dissatisfied
with the ECtHR’s allegedly activist approach. Nonetheless, there is no reason preventing the
Strasbourg Court from being satisfied with the ‘outcome’ of  this ‘meeting’.
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